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THE REHNQUIST COURT:
WHAT IS IN STORE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRECEDENT?
I. INTRODUCTION

History will remember the Rehnquist Court for its unprecedented
treatment of precedent. Although an exponent of consistency, the Court,
on a search and destroy mission, had created rather than interpreted
precedent. However, its 5-4 decision in Planned Parenthood of South

Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,' reaffirming the central holding of Roe
v. Wade,2 taught Ronald Reagan and George Bush that five appointments
to the Court did not assure them a conservative majority. And, on
January 22, 1993, newly inaugurated President William Clinton put the
Justices on 3notice that their decisions might not survive their tenure on the
high court.
The Casey opinion actually was grounded in an analysis of precedent
and emphasized the importance of stare decisis in constitutional law
decision making. 4 Remarkably, three Reagan-Bush apointees, Justices

O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, wrote the plurality opinion. 5 This new
alliance appeared to take heed of Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent in

Payne v. Tennessee,' which criticized the Rehnquist majority's
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that abortion was among a limited category of
"fundamental" rights entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection).
3. On January 22, 1993, President Clinton signed an Executive Order lifting the gag
order on federally funded abortion clinics. See Steven Greenhouse, Abortion Policy:
Protest and Praise Over Clinton's Orders, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at 21. The
Rehnquist Court had previously sustained the gag rule in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct.
1759 (1991). In addition, when the Court reconvened on the first Monday of October,
1993, Justice Byron White (a dissenter in both Roe and Casey) was replaced by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton's SailingIsn't Smooth, But It's
Sailing, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1993, § 4, at 1. Prior to her appointment to the Court,
Justice Ginsburg had been an outspoken supporter of both the right to privacy and the
freedom of choice. See generally Neil A. Lewis, BalancedJurist atHome in the Middle,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1993, at 20.
4. See discussion infra Part III.B.1, 2, and 3.
5. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2802. Casey was the first joint opinion issued since the
Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976. See Ruth Marcus, 5-4 Court Declines to
Overrule Roe; But Limits Permitted on Abortion, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at Al.
6. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (upholding the admission, during capital sentencing, of
evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the
crime on the victim or his family and friends). Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion reversed two recent cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the
admission of victim impact evidence in capital murder sentencing proceedings. Id.; see
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willingness to overrule recent constitutional precedents without "the type

of extraordinary showing that this Court has historically demanded." 7 In

Payne, Justice Marshall sharply disputed the majority's notion that stare
decisis exerted less force in constitutional decisions than in those involving
economic entitlements. 8 He concluded that "[the majority's] campaign to
resurrect yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander the authority and the
legitimacy of this Court. .. " In Casey, the plurality noted that there
was "a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the
country's belief in the Court's good faith."10 They recognized that, if
that point were reached, "the legitimacy of the Court would fade with the
frequency of its vacillation." 11 Although they did not mention Justice
Marshall's scathing Payne dissent, clearly, the plurality had heard and
incorporated his message.
This note discusses the role of precedent in constitutional law." The
discussion focuses on two recent Supreme Court opinions to determine
whether the individual Justices utilize a mechanical, objective approach to
14
stare decisis, 3 or whether they use a more subjective one.
Specifically, this note contrasts Chief Justice Rehnquist's Payne majority
opinion with both Justice Marshall's Payne dissent, and the plurality
opinion in Casey."5 Finally, this note concludes that there is little
adherence to precedent and virtually no predictability to be found on the
Rehnquist Court. The standards have become so distorted that stare
decisis may no longer be relied upon as a consistent indicator of the
direction of constitutional law jurisprudence in the Supreme Court.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805

(1989).
7. Payne, 501 U.S. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 851-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall adopted a broader
view of the Chief Justice's distinction between "cases involving contract and property
rights" and "evidentiary and procedural" precedents. Id.
9. Id. at 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
11. Id.

12. See discussion infra parts II.A. and B.
13. Throughout this note the terms "precedent" and "stare decisis" are used
interchangeably.
14. See discussion infra Part III.A.1, 2, 3, and B.1, 2, 3.
15. Id.
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II. STARE DECIsIs AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The HistoricalFoundation of Precedent in Constitutional Law

Stare decisis, or adherence to case precedent, is deeply rooted in

American jurisprudence.' 6 Justice William 0. Douglas once wrote that

it "serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to
a society...." and that "[ilt is a strong tie which the future has to the
past."' 7 Running throughout American legal history is the concept that
judicial decisions serve as precedent for future cases by providing both

stability and predictability to the system. As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
has said, "precedent decentralizes decisionmaking and allows each judge

to build on the wisdom of others."

8

And, in a 1989 decision, Justice

Kennedy wrote:
The [Supreme] Court has said often and with great emphasis that
"the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the

rule of law." .. . [I]t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic
self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and

preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon "an

arbitrary discretion.""u
Justices Douglas and Scalia and Judge Robert Bork have all espoused an

originalist approach towards constitutional interpretation. m Justice
Douglas maintained that a judge looking at a constitutional decision
remembers "above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to
and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on
support
2
it." 1

16. See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court in Transition: Assessing the
Legitimacy of the Leading Legal Institution, 79 KY. L.J. 317, 335 (1990-91).
17. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949).
18. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability andReliability in JudicialDecisions, 73
CORNELL L. Rnv. 422, 423 (1988).
19. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Welch
v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987); and THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888)).
20. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEPTIN OF AmEcCA 159 (1990) (arguing that those
who adhere to a philosophy of original intent are more likely to respect precedent than
those who do not).
21. Douglas, supra note 17, at 736; see also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
808, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas, supranote 17, at 736); Ronald
M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 101 (1987).
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Other critics have argued that in constitutional cases stare decisis
functions unpredictably, if not arbitrarily. ' Many agree with Professor
Henry P. Monaghan ' that it strikes "with all the predictability of a
lightning bolt."' This view was most recently reinforced in Payne,2S
which explicitly overruled both Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina
v. Gathers," precedents barely three years old.' More than any other
court, the Supreme Court is less predictable precisely because it is bound
only by its own decisions and the actual text of the Constitution.? In his
often cited Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas dissent," Justice Brandeis
argued that the Court should treat past decisions with less deference in
constitutional cases than in ordinary litigation.31 He noted that in most
cases "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
for it to be settled right."32 Justice Brandeis argued that even when a
serious mistake occurs in a non-constitutional decision, the failure of the
judiciary to overrule the decision will not necessarily leave the mistake
permanently ensconced in the law;33 the legislature may always
statutorily correct the error.'
However, Justice Brandeis argued,
22. See Note, ConstitutionalStare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1344 (1990).
23. Professor Monaghan is the Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law,
Columbia University.
24. Note, supra note 22, at 1345 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 390 (1981)).
25. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
26. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
27. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
28. Another example of the Court's unpredictability appears in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (revisiting fundamental questions of
federalism for the third time in a period of only 17 years, and overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968))). See id. at 557. According to Professor Monaghan, Garcia is the
most dramatic illustration of the view that the Supreme Court is largely unconstrained
by its own precedents. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 742 (1988).
29. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmakingand Theory, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 68, 74 (1991).
30. 285 U.S. 393, 405-13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 412 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts
on the Death of Stare Decisis in ConstitutionalLaw, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 468.
32. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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legislative correction in constitutional cases is virtually impossible.'
Thus, when faced with an error, the Court must defer "to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning" and overrule the erroneous
precedent.' Although rarely successful, the amendment process remains
the only legislative option available to overrule a constitutional
7 The Court has overruled itself more than 260 times since
decision.
1810.31
The lesson learned from Justice Brandeis's dissent is that rigid
adherence to stare decisis may be inappropriate because the resolution of
every issue presented to the Court will lie permanently at the mercy of the
first Court that faced the issue. As noted by Professor Earl Maltz,' the
danger of this is particularly great when the Court has moved too far in
an activist direction.'
In this situation, it is highly unlikely that
legislative correction of the error is possible.4" A rigid adherence to
precedent would mean that this country might still be living with the
holdings of Plessy v. Ferguson42 or Lochner v. New York.'
As a
result, Justice Brandeis felt that the doctrine must be especially flexible
because, realistically, the Court is the only institution capable of
correcting its own errors.'
The importance of stare decisis in the lower federal courts is
significantly different than it is in the Supreme Court. As Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison,4' it is the province of the
Court to "say what the law is."' Justices on the Supreme Court are at
greater liberty to stray from past precedent because they are the final
35. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37. James C. Renquist, The Power Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis,
The Constitutionand the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345,351 (1986) (noting only
four instances where cases were overruled by constitutional amendments).
38. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: A Longtime Precedentfor Disregarding
Precedent, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1991, § 4, at 4.
39. Professor Maltz is an assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock.
40. See Maltz, supra note 31, at 493.

41. Id.
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. See Note, supranote 22, at 1348 (citing Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. Id.at 177.
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interpreters of what the Constitution says.4' However, judges sitting in
the federal and state courts throughout the country are bound more strictly
by Supreme Court precedent than they are by original understandings of

the Constitution.'
B. The Value of Precedent
Precedent often promotes public confidence in the law, and in turn
legitimizes the Court in the public eye. 9 Some scholars defend judicial
adherence to precedent by pointing to the values in decisionmaking it
promotes: consistency, coherence, fairness, equality, predictability and
efficiency.' Professor Monaghan has noted that those values are usually
obtained without any formal doctrine of stare decisis.51 As former
Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper 2 has remarked, stare
decisis, like so many other "principles," is "a doctrine of convenience to
both conservatives and liberals."' "Its friends . . . are determined by
the needs of the moment." 5' Often, when the Supreme Court finds a
particular holding unworkable, rather than explicitly overrule it, the Court
will find the means that its predecessors chose to be inadequate. 55 The
contemporary Court will then apply a more effective means to accomplish
the requisite ends. 6
At the height of Warren Court "activism," conservatives routinely
criticized the Justices' disregard for precedent.5 7 In 1970, they suggested
that the Court's overruling of precedent "threatened the legitimacy of its
47. See discussion infra part III.A.1. But see Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
491 (1939) ("The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it.").
48. See Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 97.
49. See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 748.
50. Id. (quoting RICHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A
THEORY OF LEGAL JusTIFIcATIoN 60-81 (1961)).

51. See id.
52. Mr. Cooper was an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel,
United States Department of Justice, during the Reagan administration.
53. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also
Monaghan, supra note 28, at 743.
54. Cooper, supra note 53, at 402.
55. See Note, supra note 22, at 1347.
56. See id.
57. See Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 72; see also BORK, supra note 20, at 348-49.
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decisionmaking." 5 Ironically, the very same conservatives have faced
a similar attack when the Rehnquist Court overruled Warren Court
precedents."
Stare decisis is, as Professor Frederick Schauer' has
stated, conditional; precedent will be binding unless there is a showing of
a substantial countervailing consideration.6 '
Thirty years before President Reagan made his first appointment to the
Court, Justice Douglas, then only a decade into his thirty-six year tenure
on the Court,' wrote that when a majority of the Court is suddenly
reconstituted, there is likely to be a period of substantial unsettling of
constitutional ideology, which can last a decade or more.' He explained
that the Court would remain unsettled until the new Justices developed
their doctrinal positions." The alternative, he wrote, was to "let the
Constitution freeze . . . [b]ut the Constitution was designed for the
vicissitudes of time," he warned, "it must never become a code which
carries the overtones of one period that may be hostile to another."'
Justice Douglas saw it as a "healthy practice (too infrequently followed)
for a court to reexamine its own doctrine. " '
Justice Douglas' expressions ring true today. It is only now, fourteen
years after Justice O'Connor led the new Republican appointments to the
Court,67 that new alliances are taking a firm hold on the Court." The
problem the Court now faces is in deciding which overtones from the past
have become counterproductive. Although the criteria are applied very
subjectively, different standards for dealing with precedent are emerging
58. PHILP B. KURLAND, POLnTCS, THE CoNsTrTON, AND THE WARREN COURT
37-38 (1970).
59. See Cooper, supra note 53, at 404.
60. Professor Schauer is a professor of law at the University of Michigan.
61. See Monaghan, supra note 28, at 757; see also Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. Ray. 571, 591-95 (1987).
62. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Justice Douglas to the Supreme Court
in 1939, where he served until 1975. He was succeeded by Justice John Paul Stevens.
See STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTONAL LAW, at lxi (2d ed. 1991).
63. See Douglas, supra note 17, at 736.

64. See id.
65. Id. at 737.
66. Id. at 746.
67. In 1981 President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Sandra Day O'Connoras the
first woman to the Supreme Court; Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Potter Stewart.
See Ed Magnuson, The Brethren's First Sister: A Supreme Court Nominee-and a
Triumphfor Common Sense, TIME, July 20, 1981, at 8.
68. See Linda Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Justices, N.Y.
TIms, Oct. 24, 1992, at Al.
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from various chambers.' The battle lines have been drawn. Among the
Reagan-Bush appointees, Chief Justice Rehnquist,' along with Justices
Scalia and Thomas, urge the overruling of virtually any precedent that
they consider "erroneously reasoned" or that were determined by 5-4
decisions, 7 ' while Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter appear to be
using a more rigid standard, taling into account additional factors ignored
by the former group.'

II. THE REHNQUIST COURT:
CRITERIA FOR OVERRULING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Historically, the Supreme Court has proffered several reasons for
overruling precedent: changed conditions have undermined the basis of a
challenged precedent;'
proven unworkability;74 decisions that were
"wrongly" reasoned;75 court difficulties in applying the challenged
rule;76 conflicting precedents;' and overruling a decision which itself

overruled precedent.7' However, the Justices have often fashioned the
criteria to suit their own purposes, either by emphasizing certain criteria,

de-emphasizing others, or creating new ones altogether. Several members
69. See id.
70. Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed to the Supreme Court by President
Richard Nixon in 1971, and was named Chief Justice by President Reagan in 1986.
71. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2861 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court has a "duty" to reconsider "when it
becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound").
72. See Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 75; see generally Payne, 501 U.S. at 808;
Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2791.
73. See Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
74. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tansit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
75. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (explaining that "Plessy was wrong the day it was
decided").
76. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) as an example of a
showing that a particular precedent has become a "detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law").
77. See Note, supra note 22, at 1346 ("the Court will also overrule when a
precedent has been so eroded by changes in the law that it no longer has an acceptable
legal basis"); see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Brandstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (overruling
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How 66) 66 (1861)).
78. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainright.'The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP.
CT. REV. 211 (1963) (analyzing these factors).
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of the Rehnquist Court have made an art of fashioning criteria to suit their

fancy.79 The Chief Justice's majority opinion in Payne provided him
with an opportunity to rework his criteria for reversing constitutional law

doctrine.'
A. Payne v. Tennessee
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Criteria for Overruling Precedent
1 and South Carolina v. Gathers,' the
In Booth v. Maryland"

Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting the

admission of victim impact evidence in capital murder sentencing
proceedings.'

In Payne v. Tennessee,' the Court sharply turned away

from that analysis by upholding the admission, during capital sentencing,
of evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the
emotional impact of the crime on the victim, his family, and his
friends.'
The decision vitiated a basic principle of constitutional
79. See discussion infra part II.A.1 and 2.
80. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 811. Chief Justice Rehnquist first presented his views
of precedent in his Garcia dissent, in which he advocated future reversal of the
majority's holding. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although
the Court did revisit the issue in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992)
(holding that statutes which affirmatively command states to act violate the Tenth
Amendment and the federalist principle encompassed by the Constitution), Justice
Rehnquist's dissent still did not garner enough support to reverse the Garcia doctrine.
81. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). A Maryland law required consideration of a victim
impact statement (VIS), which the state included in its presentence report. MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 41, 4-609(c) (1986). In this case, the VIS was based on information gathered
from the family of two murder victims. The VIS described the victims' personal
characteristics, the severe impact of the crimes on the family, and the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the crime and the defendant. See id.
82. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Gathers challenged the imposition of the death sentence
on a defendant convicted of murder and first degree criminal sexual conduct. During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor read extensively from a religious tract that
the victim had been carrying and commented on personal qualities he inferred from the
victim's possession of the tract and a voter registration card. Id. at 809. The defendant
argued that the prosecutor's use of such information rendered the imposition of the death
sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See id.
83. Id. at 810-11;Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
84. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
85. Id. at 830; see also Note, The Supreme Court: 1990 Term - Leading Cases, 105
HARv. L. REV. 177 (1991).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

criminal law, that capital sentencing should focus solely on the individual
culpability of the defendant.'
Payne involved the imposition of the death penalty in a case that arose
from the savage murder of a mother and her two year old daughter."
The victim's three year old son witnessed the murder and was brutally
assaulted, but survived.88 During the penalty phase of the trial, the
prosecutor focused heavily on the effect of the murder on the son.' By
a 6-3 vote, the Court overruled Booth and Gathers and refused to vacate
the sentence. 90
The most significant attribute of Payne may have been the reasoning
used to overrule both Booth and Gathers.9' Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, noted that Booth and Gathers were based on two
premises: "that evidence relating to a particular victim or to the harm that
a capital defendant causes a victim's family do not in general reflect on
the defendant's 'blameworthiness,' and that only evidence relating to
'blameworthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing decision."' The
Chief Justice rationalized his departure from precedent by noting that an
"important concern" of criminal law had been to assess the harm caused
by the defendant as a result of the crime charged.' This is apparent, he
wrote, in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the
appropriate punishment.' Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "two
equally blameworthy defendants may be guilty of different offenses solely
because their acts cause differing amounts of harm."95 In opinion of
Guido Calabresi, former Dean of Yale Law School,' Chief Justice
Rehnquist articulated a novel theory of precedential value that declined to
86. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
87. Payne, 501 U.S. at 811-13.
88. See id.

89. Id. at 814-16.
90. Id. at 830.
91. See id. at 808.
92. Id. at 819.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Dean Calabresi has since been appointed and is currently sitting on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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require the "extraordinary showing that this Court has historically
demanded before overruling one of its precedents."'

In Booth and Gathers (both 5-4 decisions), the Court held that
evidence and arguments relating to the victim and the impact of the
victim's death on the victim's family were per se inadmissible at a capital
sentencing hearing.' In contrast, Payne held that, if the state chose to

permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument
on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erected no per se bar.'

Justice

Marshall's dissent restated the reasoning behind Booth and Gathers."
He explained that admitting evidence of the victim's character and the
impact of the murder upon the victim's family predicated the sentencing
on "factors . . . wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of [the]

particular defendant.""'

Marshall believed that admission of victim

impact evidence created an "unacceptable risk of sentencing
arbitrariness."102
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis in Payne by invoking
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Burnet.lm He noted that conceptually, stare
decisis is a "principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence

to the latest decision. " "' The Chief Justice then proceeded to analyze
briefly when precedent may be cast aside in favor of the contemporary

Court's reasoning.1"

He explained that, because a constitutional issue

was involved, and legislative overrule was practically impossible, stare
decisis would exert less authority."° The only other alternative would
be to rely on the amendment process; however, that option was too

unreliable.
97. Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court 1990 Term: Foreword:Antidiscrimination
and ConstitutionalAccountability (What the Bork- BrennanDebate Ignores), 105 HARV.
L. REV. 80, 139 (1991); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811; Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
99. Payne, 501 U.S. at 808.
100. Id. at 844-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 845-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gathers,490 U.S. at 810, and
Booth, 482 U.S. at 504).
102. Id. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 827 ("Adhering to precedent 'is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled
right'") (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
104. Id. at 828 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
105. See id. at 827-30.
106. See id. at 828 (citing Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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Rehnquist explained that stare decisis was strongest when property and
contract rights were at issue, and because Payne involved neither of these,

the Court was not bound to the past by the same force.1" The Chief
Justice argued that reliance on precedent in property and contract cases
was somehow more deserving of protection than reliance interests in

constitutional law."'8 His reasoning implied that the burden of
demonstrating a substantial reason for overruling precedent was higher in
the former types of cases rather than in the latter. The latter group,
according to Rehnquist,

included cases involving procedural and

evidentiary rules."° But both the Court and society have relied heavily
on precedent in the area of constitutional law.'
Unlike typical contract
or property claims, constitutional law issues often involve the resolution
of crucial distinctions, such as between life and death."' In deciding

those cases, the judiciary often employs an exhausting level of scrutiny
and analysis, balancing the decisions and passions of previous Courts

12
with the realities, demands and legislation of contemporary society.'
The Court has a more limited scope in analyzing a property or
contract case where reliance interests are involved. Often the Court's
focal point is on only the actual contract or perhaps an applicable
code.'
Reliance interests do play an essential role in settling the
dispute. However, although constitutional cases do not generally involve
interpretations of contract, the parties involved have relied on the state of

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Because of the holdings in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (recognizing the right to privacy of married persons), Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to privacy to the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing the
right to marry as a part of the fundamental right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause), people have planned their lives around the rights that
nine justices found protected by the Constitution. See Planned Parenthood of South
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992).
111. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(upholding a state's ability to require by clear and convincing evidence that an
incompetent person would desire to order the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment).
112. See id.

113. See, e.g., Burnet, 285 U.S. at 393 (holding that a lease was an instrumentality
of the state in carrying out its duty with respect to public schools, and that taxing the
income of the lessee arising from the lease would amount to an imposition on the lease
itself).
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the law at the time the
issue arose, just as the parties involved in a
114
contract dispute have.
Consider the following hypothetical: An offeror enters into a
multi-million dollar real-estate agreement, and relies on the law permitting
such an agreement and receives the necessary zoning approvals. A
woman relies on the legal option of an abortion when deciding to have
intercourse without the intent to conceive. Several months later, a new
Court, hostile to both big business and to the right to privacy, decides that
the offeror's type of agreement is now forbidden; the zoning approval
revoked, the agreement now retroactively invalidated. The offeror loses
millions. The Court also overrules Roe and recognizes abortion only in
proven cases of rape. As it happens, contraception fails, and the woman
wants to abort, but cannot. The offeror's livelihood is now destroyed, and
the land valueless. The woman is now forced to consider an illegal
abortion or to have a child that she does not want.
Both parties relied on the Court's precedent and the state of the law,
and now both suffer tremendously, not because of proven unworkability
or a wrongly decided decision, but because the Court's composition has
changed. Neither a "'special justification' nor 'subsequent changes or
developments in the law' that undermined the decision's rationale," 1 15
occurred in the aforementioned hypotheticals. The Court changed because
the political winds changed direction.
Now suppose that the Court in the hypothetical implements Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Payne analysis. That analysis would most likely
protect the offeror's reliance on precedent. However, it probably would
not protect the woman's reliance on precedent. Chief Justice Rehnquist
would hold the offeror's financial interests in higher regard than the
fundamental right to privacy. Both parties had strong reliance interests.
However, one was based primarily on the common law (essentially a
doctrine of precedent), and the other on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6 It is ironic that the Chief Justice shows more
deference to common law that has developed through decisions of the
lower courts, than he does to the decisions of his brethren.
114. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809 ("[P]eople have organized intimate relationships
and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in
reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.").
115. Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173
(1989)).
116. The plurality opinion in Casey notes that the woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The Chief Justice argued in Payne that cases decided by the

"narrowest margins, over spirited dissents . . ."17 and those that

"defied consistent application by the lower courts,""' were ripe for
overruling." 9 Instead of satisfying the "special justification" burden that
Justice Marshall and past Courts had established, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
decision added a new criterion that left stare decisis without a constraining
force. 1" Analyzing the Payne decision, one commentator has noted
that, "if a decision is unanimous or determined by a strong majority,
subsequent adherence to the precedent probably stems not from the power
of stare decisis itself, but from continuing support for the original
holding. "121

When Gathers was decided in 1989, it was a 5-4 decision finding a
per se violation of the Eighth Amendment." Justice Brennan ivrote for
the majority." :
One year later, Justice Brennan retired and was
replaced by Justice Souter.1" When Payne was decided that year, the
change in Court personnel shifted the balance. Justice Souter provided the
critical vote to hold that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a per se bar
against victim impact evidence. " The Payne opinion turned stare
decisis into what was described as a doctrine of "judicial politics, not law,
holding that like cases need not be treated alike, as long as they are
treated by different judges.""

6

Rigid adherence to every past decision is not a court's wisest choice.
However, no adherence does not seem appropriate either. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Payne opinion erred not only because precedent was cast
aside, but also because the means to his conclusion did not rest on firm
ground. As Justice Marshall explained in his Payne dissent, "neither the
law nor the facts supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in
the last four years. " 127 The Chief Justice displayed little respect for, or
faith in a doctrine that helped American jurisprudence develop and mature
over the past three centuries.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Payne, 501 U.S. at 829.
Id. at 830.
See id.
See Note, supra note 85, at 183.
Id.
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
Id. at 806.
See Fred Strasser et al., New Term, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at A15.
See Payne, 501 U.S. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring).

126. See Note, supra note 85, at 184.
127. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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2. The Concurring Opinions in Payne: The "Special Justification"
Standard
Concurring in Payne, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, argued that, contrary to Justice Marshall's dissent, it was Booth,
and not Payne that compromised "the fundamental values underlying..
. stare decisis." 11 Justice Scalia's argument was premised on the idea
that Booth's prohibition of victim impact evidence at the sentencing level
conflicted with a "public sense of justice" and diminished respect for both
By overruling Booth, the Court might
the courts and the law. 1"
disregard the "special justification" requirement of stare decisis, but would
instead be following the general principle that "the settled practices and
expectations of a democratic society should generally not be disturbed by
the courts." 11°
Justice Souter, in a concurrence joined by Justice Kennedy, defended
the notion that the Court should offer a "special justification" before
departing from precedent."' However, unlike Justice Marshall, Justice
Souter found that the Court did have a special justification. 1 He found
that Booth fell into the category of wrongly decided and unworkable
precedent.33 Justice Souter's concurrence tried, but failed, to narrow
the scope of both the majority's and Justice Scalia's opinions."
Although Justice Souter made reference to the doctrine of precedent, he
too did little more than tip his hat.
3. Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Conscience of the Court
The Payne dissent was Justice Marshall's last opinion before he
announced his retirement after a quarter century on the Court. 35 It was
also one of his most bitter dissents. Justice Marshall accused the majority
of relying on "[p]ower, not reason" in overruling the Booth and Gathers
He strongly criticized the majority's willingness to
decisions.
128. Id. at 835 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 835 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 842 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at

212).
132. See id. (Souter, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 842-43 (Souter, J.concurring).
134. Note, supra note 85, at 180.
135. MarshallRetiresfrom U. S. Supreme Court, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1991, at Al.
Justice Marshall retired from the Court on June, 27, 1991. Id.
136. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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overrule recent constitutional precedents without "the type 1of
3
extraordinary showing that this Court has historically demanded."
Justice Marshall also saw the majority as declaring itself "free to discard
any principle of constitutional liberty which was recognized or reaffirmed
over the dissenting votes of four Justices and with which five or more
Justices now disagree."1 31 Marshall warned that the majority's clear
message was that "scores of established constitutional liberties" were now
"ripe for reconsideration .... "119
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice Marshall's
dissent indicate that different theories of stare decisis were competing
with each other on the High Court. Justice Marshall applied a higher
level of scrutiny when determining whether a precedent should be
overruled. 1" He quoted the majority in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health,14 as stating, "this Court has repeatedly stressed

that fidelity to precedent is fundamental to 'a society governed by the rule
of law' ....

142

Justice Marshall began with the understanding that a departure from
precedent should not occur without a "special justification." 13 He
refuted the majority's criteria for overruling precedent, rather than setting
out his own specific criteria. 1" He noted that "'special justifications'
have often included the emergence of 'subsequent changes or
developments in the law' that undermine a decision's rationale," 14 or
a showing that a particular precedent has become a "detriment to
coherence and consistency in the law."" Justice Marshall could not
understand how the majority could "seriously claim that any of these
traditional bases for overruling a precedent" applied to Booth or
Gathers.14 The Justice noted that the majority did not even claim that
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id. at 848-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Payne, 501 U.S. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S.

at 420).
143.
144.
145.
203, 212
146.
147.

Id. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
ld. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
(1984) and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson,491 U.S. at 173).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the legal rationale of Booth and Gathers had been undercut by changes or
developments in doctrine during the two years preceding Payne.14
The Payne majority and dissent did agree that an important factor in
the analysis of precedent was whether a holding has "defied consistent
application by the lower courts," with the majority asserting that both
Booth and Gathers had." Justice Marshall saw the majority's evidence
as a "feeble attempt" to support its claim. 1"
Marshall noted that, until Payne, a change in Court personnel had
"almost universally [been] understood not to be sufficient to warrant
overruling a precedent .

. . . "1

The majority, he asserted, was

attempting to rationalize its decision by arguing that constititional claims
and 5-4 decisions deserved less consideration in favor of stare decisis than
do cases involving property and contract rights."
Justice Marshall
lashed out at Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument:
This truncation of the Court's duty to stand by its own precedents
is astonishing. By limiting full protection of the doctrine of stare
decisis to cases involving property and contract rights, the
majority sends a clear signal that essentially all decisions
implementing the personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment are open to reexamination. 5M
Marshall ominously warned that "the continued vitality of literally scores
of decisions must be understood to depend on nothing more than the
proclivities of the individuals who now comprise a majority of the
Court.""
Chief Justice Rehnquist's logic seems to imply that when
constitutional doctrine is examined by the Court it lies first at the mercy
of the executive branch and its judicial appointments, and then it depends
on the subjectivity of the judiciary's interpretation of precedent.
The Payne dissent concluded that the majority's conception of stare
decisis would destroy the Court's capacity to "resolve authoritatively the
abiding conflicts between those with power and those without."155
Justice Marshall invoked language from a concurrence by Justice Stevens
148. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 830.

150. Id. at 850 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
154. Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
155. Id.at 853 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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to accentuate his point.1" Justice Stevens had once written, "[i]t is the
unpopular or beleaguered individual not the man in power who has the
greatest stake in the integrity of the law."",7 Justice Marshall explained
that "[i]f this Court shows so little respect for its own precedents, it can
hardly expect them to be treated more respectfully by the state actors
whom these decisions are supposed to bind."'
Justice Marshall's strongest attack was reserved for the majority's idea
that any constitutional liberty recognized by a 5-4 vote "over a spirited
dissent" is ripe for reconsideration.'- The majority would be inviting
state actors to renew the policies that a previous Court had held
unconstitutional "in the hope that this Court may now reverse course, even
if it has only recently reaffirmed the constitutional liberty in
question. "1 o

Overruling Booth and Gathers was "but a preview of an even broader
and more far-reaching assault upon this Court's precedents,"161 Justice
Marshall wrote in the final paragraph of his Payne dissent. He feared that
the majority's opinion would surely be the death knell for future victims,
who may include minorities, women, or the indigent."
His final
statement foreshadowed what would consume the Casey plurality 368 days
later. Justice Marshall ended his quarter-century reign as the conscience
of the Court with these words: "[ljnevitably, this campaign to resurrect
yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander the authority and the
legitimacy of this Court as a protector of the powerless."'v
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Emergence of A New Plurality
The Payne opinions set the stage for the decisive battle that would
engulf the Supreme Court the next term. The debate over stare decisis
came to a climax in the Casey decision, perhaps because President Bush
had replaced Justice Marshall with Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas
immediately aligned himself with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. Alignments on the Court were beginning to shift. After Casey it
156. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
158. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 854 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See id, (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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looked as if a new center was taking control of the Court,1 and stare
decisis would be the great divide.
In 1992 the Rehnquist Court could no longer put off what it had only
hinted at through a line of cases that slowly chipped away at the right to
abortion recognized two decades earlier in Roe v. Wade.1" The Casey
decision surprised many when it came down."
The Court had the
opportunity, and it was thought, the necessary votes and inclination, to
overrule Roe.167 However, led by an unlikely trio, Justices 0' Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, the Court concluded that "the essential holding of
Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed."" s The
plurality opinion cried out for debate. The lengthy discussion of precedent
was in sharp contrast to the Rehnquist majority opinion in Payne, which
lowered the Court's burden in protecting constitutional law precedent." 6
Before the five provisions of a new Pennsylvania abortion statute

could take effect, the petitioners"F brought suit seeking a declaratory

judgment that each of the provisions was unconstitutional on its face.
164. See Marcia Coyle, New Trio Stands Up to Court's HardRight, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at Si, S3; see also Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (a 5-4
decision holding that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibited public
school officials from including nonsectarian prayers in a middle school graduation
ceremony).
165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a statute that required a doctor to give notice to one of a
minor's parents or, under some circumstances, to another relative of a minor, before
performing an abortion); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a
statute prohibiting an abortion performed on a minor until at least 48 hours after both
parents are notified); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (demonstrating that a majority of the Court finds Roe's
trimester framework "unworkable" and "problematic").
166. See Ruth Marcus, 5-4 Court Declines to Overrule Roe; But Limits Permitted
on Abortion, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at Al (explaining that the Supreme Court
defied all predictions that it was prepared to eliminate the right to abortion and instead
adopted a middle-ground approach).
167. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 24-25 (1992) (noting that the
Court defied prophecies with the Casey decision because it was widely believed that with
five newly appointed justices, a conservative Court would "gut the abortion right").
168. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
169. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
170. The petitioners included five abortion clinics and a physician representing
himself and a class of doctors who provided abortion services. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2803.
171. Id.
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The petitioners also sought injunctive relief." The district court held
all of the provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their
enforcement. 17 However, the court of appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part, striking down the spousal notification provision but
upholding the other provisions.174 The petitioners then challenged the
constitutionality of the 1988 and 1989 amendments to the Pennsylvania
abortion statute' s on due process grounds. 176

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis required the
reaffirmance of Roe v. Wade's essential holding, which recognized a

woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viability. 177 However,
the Casey plurality opinion held that the undue burden test, rather than
Roe's trimester framework," should be used in evaluating abortion
restrictions before viability."' In addition, the Court upheld all of the
Pennsylvania restrictions as not unduly burdensome, except for the spousal
notification provision, which the Court held did impose an undue burden

and was therefore invalid."8
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3203-3220 (1990). The provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act challenged were: § 3205, requiring voluntary and informed consent
of a woman seeking an abortion except in the case of a medical emergency, and outlining
certain information which must be provided to a woman, at least 24 hours prior to the
abortion, by the physican who is to perform the abortion; § 3206, requiring informed
consent from both the pregnant woman and one parent, except in the case of a medical
emergency, when the woman seeking the abortion is under 18 years of age or adjudged
incapacitated, but under § 3206(c) allows for judicial bypass if the parents refuse to
consent or if the woman chooses not to seek consent of her parents; § 3209, requiring,
with certain exceptions, that a married woman seeking an abortion sign a statement that
she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion; § 3203, defining a
"medical emergency" which would excuse a woman seeking an abortion from complying
with the foregoing requirements; and §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f), imposing reporting
requirements on facilities providing abortion seryices.
176. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
177. Id.
178. The plurality actually rejected the trimester framework in Part IV of their
opinion, however, that part of the opinion was supported by only three justices:
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. See id. at 2818.
179. Id. at 2820.
180. Id. at 2830 (holding that the spousal notification provision was a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion).
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The plurality opinion was divided into six parts, with a majority of
Justices concurring in all but Parts IV, V-B, and V-D. Part I' was
dedicated to an analysis of the specific controversy involving Roe's
essential holding, and where it stood following subsequent Court rulings
that limited its application."
The Court noted that Roe's essential
holding, and the one that the Casey Court reaffirmed, had three parts."
First, the Court recognized the right of a woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State.'" Second, the Court confirmed the State's power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, only if the law contained exceptions for
pregnancies that endanger a woman's life or health."
Finally, Roe
recognized that the State had legitimate interests in protecting the health
of the woman and the life of a fetus that could become a child."
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."'
With this
statement, the plurality set the tone for its decision in which it would
tackle the role of stare decisis in Supreme Court review'8
They
recognized that the Court's post-Roe decisions had "cast doubt upon the
meaning and reach of its holding." 89 The plurality also noted that Chief
Justice Rehnquist would "overrule the central holding of Roe and adopt
the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of constitutionality." 190
Furthermore, the plurality felt it necessary for state and federal courts, as
well as state legislatures, to have guidance as they address this issue "in
"'
conformance with the Constitution." 19
Given these premises, the
plurality found "it imperative to review once more the principles that
define the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State
respecting the termination of pregnancy by abortion procedures."" 9 If
ever a constitutional issue cried out to be "settled," this was it. However,
181. Part I of the opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, in addition
to Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
182. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-04.
183. Id. at 2804.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 2803.
Id. at 2804.
Id. at 2803.
Id. at 2803-04.
Id. at 2804.
Id.
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contrary to Justice Brandeis's opinion in Bumet, 193 this area of the law
not only has to be settled, it must be settled "right."
1. The Constitutional Protection of A Woman's Right to Choose:
Reaffirmed
Part II of the Casey" opinion dealt with the constitutional
protection of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. The plurality
recognized that a liberty right was involved1" and reaffirmed that this
right derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1" "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm
of personal liberty which the government may not enter. " ' 97 With this
statement the plurality cogently restated the link between Roe and the
other liberty interests that the Court has protected from state interference
by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.1 93 They noted
that neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of states at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marked the outer limits
of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
protects. 1"
However, they explained, the Constitution does place
"limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood."'
The plurality also addressed the personal side of the abortion
controversy."
They admitted that some of them as individuals found
193. See supratext accompanying notes 30-36.
194. Part II of the opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens in addition
to Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter.
195. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2805.

198. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987) (invalidating a prison
regulation that prohibited marriages between inmates or between inmates and other
persons, unless permission for the marriage was given by prison authorities on the basis
of compelling circumstances); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating
a Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481-82 (1965) (striking down a law which prohibited the use of contraceptives by
married people); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating
a state law which prohibited private religious schools).
199. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
200. Id. at 2806. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82
(1977) (invalidating law prohibiting sale of contraceptives to persons under age 16);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-43 (1972) (invalidating a statute which prohibited
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
201. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
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abortion offensive to their most basic principles of morality, but they
reconciled that with their obligation to "define the liberty of all, not to
mandate [their] own moral code."m Indeed, this section of the opinion
exemplifies the problem that the Justices have faced in addressing an area
of the law that touches on such personal and private subjects.
The Casey decision was particularly surprising because the plurality
seized upon the opportunity to address an area of constitutional doctrine
that the Rehnquist Court usually avoided. The plurality noted that "[a]t
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' They
began their analysis of a woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy
by highlighting the balance that must occur between a woman's liberty
interest and the interests of those who will face the consequences of her
actions.
The plurality explained that, although abortion was conduct
and not speech, it did not follow that the State was entitled to proscribe
that conduct in all instances, because "the liberty of the woman is at stake
in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. " '
They noted that a woman's suffering is "too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and
our culture."'"
The plurality concluded Part II by arguing that, although they had
reservations about reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the reasons were
"outweighed by the explication of individual liberty that we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis."° 7 It is at this point that the
plurality embarked upon their analysis of stare decisis. Part I of the
opinion would bring an aloof Court down from its bench and into the
conscience of the country.
2. The Force of Stare Decisis in the Hands of the Plurality
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter began their discussion of
precedent by invoking the words of Justice Cardozo: "[w]ith Cardozo, we
recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each
202. Id.

203. Id. at 2807.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2808.
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They noted that if a prior

judicial ruling was seen as so clearly erroneous that its enforcement was

doomed, continued respect for it would become dispensable.'

They

explained that whenever the Court re-examines a prior holding, its

judgment is usually informed by "a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
decision
and determining the costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior
210
case."

The plurality examined the viability of Roe by looking at five essential
factors that became the plurality's "test" for determining the current

applicability of a prior Court holding: whether the holding had been found

unworkable;2 11 whether the holding could be removed or adjusted
without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it;212 whether the
law's growth in the intervening years had left the rule a doctrinal
anachronism discounted by society; 1 whether the case's factual premise
had changed in the ensuing years so as to render its holding irrelevant or

214 and finally, the
unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed;
215
entirety.
their
in
criteria
Court looked at these
The plurality clearly stated that, although Roe had faced considerable
opposition, "it has in no sense proven 'unworkable'." 216 The Justices
categorized Roe as representing merely a limitation "beyond which a state

law is unenforceable.

"217

They appeared to distinguish a difference

between a particular holding necessitating periodic judicial assessment of
state laws, and one that had been proven unworkable by the judiciary.218

208. Id. (referring to BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
149 (1921)).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id.; see, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
212. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808; see, e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,
265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924).
213. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809; see, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989).
214. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809; see, e.g., Burnetv. Coronado Oil& Gas, 285 U.S.
393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
216. See id. at 2809 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 546 (1985)).
217. Id.
218. See i.
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Next, the plurality examined the reliance interests that were based on
the original Roe holding.2" 9 The Court inquired as to the cost of
repudiating the rule to those who had reasonably relied on its continued
application.'
They called attention to the difference between reliance
interests in the commercial setting and those in the area of individual
liberty."
The difference had most recently been explained by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in his Payne majority opinion.'m The Chief Justice
had argued that notions of stare decisis weigh more heavily in favor of
contract and property cases because of the reliance interest that he
hypothesized was not as relevant in constitutional issues.'
The Casey
plurality did note that there was "no surprise that some would find no
reliance worthy of consideration in support of Roe."'
The plurality
explained that some Justices viewed Roe as not worthy of reliance
precisely because it was not in the commercial context where, according
to the Payne majority, "advance planning of great precision is most
obviously a necessity."'

The plurality discussed the arguments that could be made by
contrasting the reliance interests in contract and property cases with those
in abortion cases.' They noted that abortion was usually chosen as an
"unplanned response to the consequence of unplanned activity or to the
failure of conventional birth control, and except on the assumption that no
intercourse would have occurred but for Roe's holding, such behavior may
appear to justify no reliance claim."'
The plurality saw that situation
as "unrealistic,"' and any reliance interest, they hypothesized, would
be de minimis.tm They also saw this argument as "premised on the
hypothesis that reproductive planning could take virtually immediate
account of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions."'
However, to eliminate the reliance issue that easily, the plurality noted
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.

222. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
223. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
224. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.

225. Id.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

230. Id.
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that cognizable reliance would have to be limited to "specific instances of
sexual activity." 11

The plurality reached beyond legal theory and suggested that, if the
above argument was implemented, the judiciary would be refusing to
"face the fact that for two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail." 32
The plurality explained that "[t]he ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives."' They also recognized that
"[t]he Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance
on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of
overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living
around that case be dismissed."'
2 35
Roe's stability was an essential part of the plurality's analysis,
which began by noting that "[n]o evolution of legal principle has left
Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973."23 Roe, they
wrote, "stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions."' 3 The first
path, and the one chosen by the Roe Court, was the succession of privacy
and liberty cases exemplified by Griswold.3
The second path led to the rule of "personal autonomy and bodily
integrity,""9 comparable to cases recognizing limits on governmental
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.?
The
plurality felt that if one saw Roe through that line of cases, then a state
"interest in the protection of life fell short of justifying any plenary
override of individual liberty claims.""
Another possibility was to
classify Roe as sui generis. Viewed as such, there could be no erosion of
its central holding. However, the twenty-year old Roe precedent had
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 2810.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id.; see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990); cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992).
241. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
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originally been supported by a concurrence of seven, and subsequently had
been reaffirmed by a majority in 1983, in 1986, and again in 1989.Y
The plurality next examined whether Roe's premises of fact had
changed so much in the ensuing twenty years as to render its central
holding unjustifiable. u 3 The plurality concluded that it had not.'
They highlighted both the developments in neo-natal care that had
advanced fetal viability to an earlier point, and the progress in maternal
health care that now allowed for safe abortions to be performed later in
a pregnancy.'
However, "these facts go only to the scheme of time
limits on the realization of competing interests."'
The Court explained
that "the divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing
on the validity of Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest
point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate
to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions." 7
The plurality concluded that their precedential inquiry well illustrated
that Roe had weathered the decades and had not been weakened in any
way that affected its central holding.'
Although Roe had met with
disapproval, it had not proven unworkable. u 9 They believed it relevant
that "[a]n entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept
of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make
reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal
autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant."'
They
saw the stronger argument in favor of reaffirming Roe's central holding,
despite "whatever degree of personal reluctance" any of them may have
had in not overruling it."
242. See id.; see City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416 (1983) (expressly affirming Roe by a majority of six in 1983); Thomburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (affirming
Roe by a majority of five); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518
(1989) (two of the present Justices questioned the trimester framework in a way
consistent with Casey; a majority of the Court either decided to reaffirm or declined to
address the constitutional validity of the central holding of Roe).
243. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
244. Id.

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2812.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Looking at this decision from the perspective of Payne, the plurality
had already proved Roe's viability under both Chief Justice Rehnquist's
and Justice Marshall's analysis. However, the plurality applied a second
level of scrutiny that analyzed the rare case involving a divisive
controversy.
3. Part II of the Casey Analysis of Precedent
The Casey plurality went beyond the ordinary analysis of
constitutional precedent; they saw Casey as the rare case encompassing the
extraordinary. 2 The plurality placed Roe in the same category as
other comparable "cases that have responded to national
controversies."" They noted "two such decisional lines from the past
century. "2-4

The first example was "the line of cases identified with Lochner v.
New York, 5 which imposed substantive limitations on legislation
limiting economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation..
. ." I According to the Casey plurality, the Lochner line of cases was
exemplified by Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C. ,' in which the
Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected liberty of
contract to require the employers of adult women to satisfy minimum
wage standards.25'
Fourteen years after Addns, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,25
the Court "signaled the demise of Lochner by overruling Adkins." '
West Coast Hotel came before the Court during the Depression and,
according to the Casey plurality, people believed that the interpretation of
contractual freedom that was protected in Lochner and Adkins "rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively
"
unregulated market to satisfy minimum levels of human welfare. 2Z
Casey noted that the facts upon which Lochner had been based had proved
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
261 U.S.
259.
260.

See id.
Id.
Id.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (discussing Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C.,
525 (1923)).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.

261. Id.
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to be untrue, and West CoastHotel's new choice of constitutional principle
was "not only justifiable but required." I
The second line of cases invoked by the plurality involved the
separate-but-equal rule and the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection guarantee.'
The plurality based this analysis on Plessy
v. Ferguson,' which held that legislatively mandated racial segregation
in public transportation was not a denial of equal protection.'
Plessy
was premised on the idea that if "the colored race" saw legislated
segregation as stamping them with "a badge of inferiority," then that was
because "the colored race" chose to put that construction on it, and not
because of anything found in the law.' This understanding of facts and
law was repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education.'
The Brown Court addressed the difference between Plessy's facts and
those of Brown. It was clear by 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation
stigmatized blacks with a "badge of inferiority to the point that racially
separate public educational facilities were deemed inherently unequal..
. ." I The Casey plurality explained that society's understanding of the
facts upon which Brown was based differed fundamentally from the Plessy
facts in 1896.'
The plurality noted that the Plessy Court's explanation
for its decision was "so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the
Court in 1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground
alone not only justified but required."'
The West Coast Hotel and Brown decisions rested on facts different
from their progeny. Each case was understood for what the facts of that
day encompassed."
When West Coast Hotel and Brown came before
the Court, society had begun to change, and the facts and principles as
they existed at the times of Lochner and Plessy could no longer withstand
judicial scrutiny. The Casey plurality noted that "[i]n constitutional
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new
obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at 2812-13.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
Id. (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95).
See id.
Id.
Id.
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decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitutional

duty." tm

The Casey plurality found no changed circumstances that imposed new
The Court explained
obligations on society between 1973 and 1992.'

"that neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding" nor the
Court's understanding of it had changed.

4

The plurality could not

pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently than the Roe Court in
1973.Y
The Court explained that a decision to overrule Roe would
have to rest "on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior
case was wrongly decided." 6
The Casey plurality ended their analysis of precedent by examining
the structural damage the Supreme Court could suffer if too many
They noted that their analysis would not
precedents were uprooted.'
be complete without "explaining why overruling Roe's central holding
would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare
decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated
to the rule of law. "'
The plurality showed great restraint in their attempt to preserve the
"reputation" of the Court. They wrote, "[t]he Court's power lies.., in
its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in
the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
The plurality
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."'
feared that their respect and reputation would be destroyed if overruling
settled areas of the law became commonplace.'
The Casey decision appeared to be directed at those who had
suggested that recent appointees to the Court served merely as puppets of
the conservative agenda that had placed them on the bench. The plurality
explained that the Court must act in ways that will allow people to accept
their decisions on the terms that the Justices set.21 Those terms must
272. Id.

273. See id.
274. Id.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 2813-14.
Id. at 2814.
See id. at 2814-16.
Id. at 2814.
Id.
See id.

281. See id.
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be grounded in principle, and not serve as compromises between social
and political pressures having "no bearing on the principled choices that
the Court is obligated to make."'
The plurality based the Court's
legitimacy on "maldng legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
the Nation."'
The Justices believed that "the country can accept some correction of
error without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court."'
However, they argued that there was "a point beyond which frequent
overruling would overtax the country's belief in the Court's good
faith."'

They explained that the decision to overrule must be

perceived as a statement that a prior decision was wrong, and they
believed that there was a limit to the amount of error that could be
imputed to prior courts.' They concluded that "[t]he legitimacy of the
Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation."'
The plurality ultimately concluded that a case such as Roe should be
overruled only for the most compelling reason." They accepted their
"responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the
covenant [Constitution] in light of all precedents." 9 Justice Stevens
concurred with the plurality's conclusion that stare decisis should control
in a case such as Casey, "notwithstanding an individual justice's concerns
about the merits" of a case.' In an interesting footnote, he explained
that in the nineteen years between Roe and Casey, fifteen Justices had
confronted the basic issue presented in Roe; of those, eleven had voted as
the Casey majority did, and the four who did not are the same four who
signed the Casey dissent. 1
Concurring, Justice Blackmun reserved most of his discussion of stare
decisis for a sharp criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist's "narrow
conception of individual liberty and stare decisis."I Blackmun's
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 2815.

Id.

286. Id.

287. Id.
288. Id.
289.
290.
291.
292.
part, and

Id. at 2833.
Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2838 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
dissenting in part).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

concluding words were haunting; he warned that as an 83 year old justice,
he could not "remain on the court forever. "I
The Casey plurality believed that if the Court overruled such a
watershed decision as Roe without a compelling reason, it would subvert
the Court's legitimacy beyond any doubt.'
This fear served as the
dividing point between Chief Justice Rehnquist's Payne opinion, Justice
Marshall's Payne dissent, and the Casey plurality opinion. It is clear that
the Payne dissent and the Casey plurality required a "most compelling
reason" to reexamine a constitutional precedent. The Chief Justice,
however, would have set a much lower standard.
4. The Rehnquist Dissent in Casey
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia and
Thomas,' 5 began his Casey dissent by stating, in no uncertain terms,
that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it "can and should be overruled
consistently with the Court's traditional approach to stare decisis in
constitutional cases."'
Although the plurality and the dissent might
agree that certain criteria govern the analysis as to Roe's viability, the
results were very different.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first looked towards his Payne opinion in
which he stated that the "reexamination of [a] constitutional decision is
appropriate when [that] decision [has] generated uncertainty and [has]
failed to provide clear guidance."'
In Casey, the Chief Justice
believed that the Third Circuit had been faced with excessive uncertainty
and confusion in light of the post-Roe cases.2
293. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
294. See id. at 2815.
295. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting
in part).
296. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
297. Id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting
in part); see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); see also, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 557 (1985).
298. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurringin the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). The earlier cases had fine-tuned Roe. See generally Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking
down a Pennsylvania regulation requiring that a woman be informed of the risks
associated with the abortion procedure); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding that a state may not require a physician to
wait 24 hours to perform an abortion after receiving the consent of a woman); Planned
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (extending the Court's
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In his Casey dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the
plurality's discussion of stare decisis did not apply to Roe, because the
Casey opinion in his view was entirely dicta. ' He argued that Roe had

recognized a "fundamental"
right to abortion, subjected such analysis to
°
"strict scrutiny,"

and employed a trimester framework to balance the

woman's right to privacy with the State's interest. However, the Casey
plurality rejected a fundamental right to abortion, lowering the burden to

an "undue burden" standard of analysis. 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist saw
the plurality as revising precedent, rather than adhering to it.'
He
stated that what was left of Roe was a "mere facade to give the illusion of
reality."'

The Chief Justice was probably correct.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent next discussed the criteria for
overturning precedent.'

He addressed the plurality's assertion that the

main "factual underpinning" of Roe had remained the same, and "that its
doctrinal foundation [was] no weaker now than it was in 1973."'

The

Chief Justice argued instead that there was no requirement "that a decision
abortion jurisprudence and holding that a State could not require that a woman obtain the
consent of her spouse before proceeding with an abortion).
The more recent abortion decisions revamped the Roe standard. See Casey, 112 S.
Ct. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Rehnquist felt the task of the appellate court in Casey had been complicated by the most
recent cases that did not command a Court majority. See generally Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a statute that
required a doctor to give notice to one of the minor's parents before performing an
abortion on the minor); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a
requirement that both parents be notified of a minor's abortion, and that there be a 48hour waiting period between notification and the performance of the abortion); Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a state law that required
a physician to exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether a fetus that was 20
or more weeks of gestational age was viable and to use a variety of age, fetal weight,
and lung capacity tests for determining the viability of such a fetus).
299. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
300. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
301. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
302. Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting
in part).
303. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part).
304. See id. at 2861 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
305. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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be more wrong [today] than it was at the time [the decision] was
rendered.

"1

Next, the Chief Justice attacked the plurality's "reliance interests"
analysis.'
He agreed with the plurality that any traditional notion of
reliance was not applicable in this case.' But he criticized the plurality
for adopting an "unconventional-and unconvincing-notion of reliance,
a view based on the surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has
led to 'two decades of economic and social developments' that would be
undercut if the error of Roe were recognized."'
Chief Justice
310
Rehnquist felt that this assertion was "undeveloped and conclusory."
His criticism of the plurality's opinion was based solely on "generalized
assertions about the national psyche"; such as that "the people of this
country have grown accustomed to the Roe decision over the last 19 years
and have 'ordered their thinking and living around' it."311
Chief Justice Rehnquist labeled the plurality's approach to precedent
a "post hoc rationalization" for overturning cases such as Plessy and
Lochner, "despite the existence of opposition to the original decisions,
only because both the Nation and the Court had learned new lessons in the
interim."32 He also addressed the plurality's second level of review.
The Chief Justice noted that the plurality saw that "the propriety of
overruling a 'divisive' decision depends in part on whether 'most people'
would now agree that it should be overruled."33 He interpreted the
plurality as requiring "[e]ither the demise of opposition or its progression
to substantial popular agreement" in order to reconsider a divisive
decision." 4 Rather than explaining his requirements for an analysis, the
Chief Justice was concerned with attacking the plurality's restatement of
stare decisis principles.315 Although the Chief Justice succinctly
306. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part).
307. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
308. Id. at 2861 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (referring to the plurality's opinion, see id. at 2809).
309. Id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

in part).
310. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
311. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part).
312. Id. at 2864 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting
in part).
313. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
314. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
315. See id. at 2862-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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countered each criterion of the plurality's test, he left behind only his
criticism; there was no countervailing approach to be found.
The Chief Justice closed his discussion of stare decisis by indicating
that Roe v. Wade stood as a judicial "Potemkin Village"; behind the
facade stood an entirely new analysis without any roots in constitutional
law. 16 This was Rehnquist's most compelling insight into the plurality
opinion. A fuzzy line exists between his Payne dissent and the plurality's
Casey decision. Whether Rehnquist would overturn precedent because he
thinks it was wrongly decided, or whether the Casey plurality would
overturn precedent contingent on the public's response, neither pays
homage to the doctrine of stare decisis.
5. Justice Scalia's Casey Dissent
In classic Scalia style, he berated Justice O'Connor's "undue burden"
standard with a barrage of contemptuous prose.3 17 Justice Scalia's
analysis of precedent was also more limited than the plurality's. He said
that he would not "swell the United States Reports with repetitions" of
what he had said before: Roe should fall.318 Justice Scalia suggested that
in determining when stare decisis should be followed, a Court must ask,
"how wrong was the decision on its face?"319 The Justice believed that
the plurality never answered this question, and he found that Roe "was
plainly wrong. " ' He viewed the Casey plurality's reliance upon stare
decisis as "contrived."" 1 He explained, "stare decisis ought to be
applied even to the doctrine of stare decisis," and he "confessed" to never
having heard of the plurality's "new, keep-what-you-want-andthrow-away-the-rest version. " '
Justice Scalia's problem with the plurality was based on a presumed
discrepancy between what the substantive doctrine of Roe actually was,
and what stare decisis was actually saving. Contrary to the plurality's
316. Id. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
317. Id. at 2876-78 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (describing "It]he rootless nature of the 'undue burden' standard, a phrase plucked
out of context. . ."). Id. at 2878.
318. Id. at 2874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
319. id. at 2875 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
320. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
321. See id. at 2881 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting

in part).
322. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LIW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

opinion, Scalia thought that the discarded "arbitrary" trimester framework
was "as central to Roe as the arbitrary viability test," which the Court
retained in Casey.' The Justice found the plurality's ability "to call a
'central holding' whatever it wants to call a 'central holding'" to be one
of the difficulties with their "modified version of stare decisis."' He
criticized the plurality for "engaging in the hopeless task of predicting
public perception"' in determining which constitutional doctrines would
go or stay.'
In his opinion the analysis should come down to two
questions: Was Roe correctly decided? And, did Roe succeed in producing
a settled body of law?' If the answer to both was "no," then Justice
Scalia felt Roe should "undoubtedly be overruled."
Where the Payne and Casey pluralities were concerned with setting
out criteria for overturning precedent, the Casey dissenters were less
concerned with policy than with highlighting the flaws in the plurality's
logic and application. It is clear that the Rehnquist Court is fractionalized.
Although the criteria called upon were similar, the applications varied
according to the agendas that each Justice brought to the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION

As Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan has written, the Reagan and Bush
appointees to the Supreme Court are divided into two camps: those who
favor continuity with precedent; and those who would give continuity little
independent value. 3' The surprise in Casey, noted the professor, was
that the plurality did not use Chief Justice Rehnquist's
overrule-when-wrong standard from Payne.3
Instead, the Casey
plurality's rule became: Never overrule constitutional decisions; but there
are always exceptions. 1
Precedent can be overruled under the
plurality's test only if the old case proved to be too "unworkable"; if the
323. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
324. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
325. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).

326. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
327. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
328. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
329. See Sullivan, supranote 166, at 69-70 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia are strong proponents of the interpretive and operative rules approach).
330. Id. at 70.
331. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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people's "reliance" on the old case was not too great; if the surrounding
law changed too much; or, if the underlying facts changed too much.2
The aforementioned criteria fit fairly well with traditional stare decisis
analysis, including that outlined by Justice Marshall in Payne.'
However, the Casey plurality departs from Justice Marshall's analysis by
implementing the "decisive" issue standard for overruling cases.
Professor Sullivan interpreted the plurality's decision to mean that if there
was a "decisive" issue before the Court, the Court should disregard the
four-factor test, and instead should "stand fast unless there is something
like a civil war."'
Although the Casey plurality stated that they were reaffirming the
central holding of Roe, in fact, all that remains is a facade. It is as if the
Court removed all of the nails in a house, and watched from across the
street, waiting for the wind to blow it down. In fact, the plurality tore
down the Roe trimester framework and replaced it with the ill-fitting
undue burden standard.'
Justice Marshall's warning of endangered precedents still resonates
throughout the courtrooms of America. The Casey plurality became stuck
in the political quicksand of Roe, rather than wading through to more solid
ground. The Casey dissenters stayed on their own wayward course and
watched the plurality sink, taking Roe with them. However, neither
opinion left a discernible track showing where the Court will go next.
How the Rehnquist Court will rule on constitutional issues in the future
remains unpredictable.
Carolyn D. Richmond

332.
333.
334.
335.

See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09.
See discussion supra Part II.
Sullivan, supranote 166, at 72.
See discussion supra Part l.B.

